nas-search-mcp@r1
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Enables AI agents to search the existing Universal Search index of a Synology NAS over SSH and receive JSON results, running as a normal DSM user with 2FA intact and read-only access. It exposes search and status MCP tools covering file names and document text." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is nas-search-mcp@r1 safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
Synology NAS の Universal Search インデックスを使う、sudo 不要の検索ツールです。AI エージェントからは MCP サーバーとしても、コマンド(CLI)としても使えます。ファイルの更新やインデックスの変更はしません。Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.- sudo や root 権限を要求しない。DSM の2段階認証を外さないFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."search x; cat /etc/passwd", "search x --allow-prefix /homes",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.for command in ("", "ls", "rm -rf /", "search", "search ''", "search x --raw",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.proc = subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, MCP], stdin=subprocess.PIPE,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.for command in ("", "ls", "rm -rf /", "search", "search ''", "search x --raw",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.key=~/.ssh/unisearch_agentFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.out = subprocess.run([sys.executable, MCP, "--version"], stdout=subprocess.PIPE,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# 使い回しは ~/.ssh があるときだけ。CI には無いので、短いパスに仮の HOME を作るFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim umayado17: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.