Skills/Glama/nana800-mcp-server

nana800-mcp-server@1.2.1

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Build and manage nana800.io no-code automations from an AI assistant: create schemes, add and connect trigger and action blocks (webhooks, Telegram, Google Sheets, GPT and 60+ integrations), read run history and export analytics." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher interhub · publishing for 3 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 3d ago
$npx skills add nana800-mcp-server
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MCP_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_ANALYTICS_API_URL, MCP_ANALYTICS_ORG_ID, MCP_API_URL, MCP_PROJECT_ID, MCP_SCHEME_ID
Where it talks to
nana800.io (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for MCP_API_KEY and talks to nana800.io. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets MCP_API_KEY=nana800.io -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)SKILL.md:5 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkMCP server interhub/nana800-mcp-server on Glama, built from https://github.com/interhub/nana800-mcp-server.Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known package.codemap.yaml:31 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted coderun: "npx -y nana800-mcp-server (bin nana800-mcp → dist/index.js)"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈40 tok
1 file · 21 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.