Skills/Glama/muninn

muninn@r1

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Code search for AI coding agents over MCP: hybrid retrieval, structural search and shared indexing across Git worktrees." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher kamysh · publishing for 0 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 1 h ago
$npx skills add muninn
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · 4 of 4 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
PGPASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: MUNINN_PERSISTENCE_TEST_CONFIG, MUNINN_TUI_PTY_CHILD, MUNINN_TUI_RESIZE_TRIGGER, PGPASSFILE
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso voyageai.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names voyageai.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects PGPASSWORD only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is muninn@r1 safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-17 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.0sprocessexited 1: Nix is required for this source-build helper; use release downloads otherwise.
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1: CLI/TUI catalog check: [Errno 2] No such file or directory: '/tmp/ks-detonate-oOxOft/scripts/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/muninn/spec/CLI-TUI-COVERAGE.json'
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1: daemon catalog check: [Errno 2] No such file or directory: '/tmp/ks-detonate-oOxOft/scripts/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/muninn/spec/DAEMON-COVERAGE.json'
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 1: FileNotFoundError: [Errno 2] No such file or directory: '/tmp/ks-detonate-oOxOft/scripts/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/muninn/spec/Muninn/Catalog.agda'
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessexited 1: Record correspondence check: [Errno 2] No such file or directory: '/tmp/ks-detonate-oOxOft/scripts/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/muninn/spec/RECORD-CORRESPONDENCE.json'
0.3sprocess4 of 4 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.3sprocessexited 1: Nix is required for this source-build helper; use release downloads otherwise.

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscrates/core/src/repo_resolver.rs:278 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files.env(Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscrates/mcp/src/worktree_tests.rs:36 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files.env("GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM", "1")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscrates/mcp/src/worktree_tests.rs:37 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files.env("GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL", "/dev/null")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandcrates/core/src/config.rs:327 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsand should be readable only by the owner (chmod 600 {:?})",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscrates/cli/src/tui/tests.rs:579 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files.env("TERM", "xterm-256color")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscrates/cli/src/tui/tests.rs:578 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files.env("MUNINN_TUI_PTY_CHILD", scenario)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscrates/core/src/repo_resolver.rs:277 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files.env("GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM", "1")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandcrates/core/src/config.rs:386 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions# File selection: pgpassfile, PGPASSFILE, then ~/.pgpass (chmod 600).Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionspec/OWNED-STATE.md:21 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…istinguishes a deletion from a version reference | | `migrations/repo/001_chunks.sql`, `worktrees.sql`: `chunks` and its generated `ts_vector` / optional `embedding` | `chunk`, `posting`, `vector`; each kind remains independently observabl…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscrates/core/src/repo_resolver.rs:283 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files.env("GIT_EDITOR", "true")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionspec/OWNED-STATE.md:18 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files| `migrations/public/001_init.sql`: `knowledge` | `note`, `notePosting`, `noteVector`; the generated text and optional vector are independently visible to outcomes |Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscrates/core/src/repo_resolver.rs:282 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files.env("GIT_CONFIG_COUNT", "0")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandcrates/core/src/password.rs:35 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"password file ignored: group or world permissions; use chmod 600"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscrates/core/src/worktrees/mod.rs:614 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files.env("GIT_OPTIONAL_LOCKS", "0")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈5,148 tok
3 files · 80 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.