Skills/Glama/mongreldb-viewer

mongreldb-viewer@1.6.7

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Desktop viewer and MCP server for MongrelDB" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher visorcraft · publishing for 3 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 3d ago
$npx skills add mongreldb-viewer
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MONGRELDB_VIEWER_PASSWORDMONGRELDB_VIEWER_TOKEN or --auth-tokenConfiguration, not credentials: EXEC_PATH, MONGRELDB_VIEWER_PATH, MONGRELDB_VIEWER_SERVER, MONGRELDB_VIEWER_USER, REGEN_COMPAT_FIXTURE, TAURI_DEV_HOST, VITE_AUTO_OPEN_DB, WAYLAND_DISPLAY, XDG_CURRENT_DESKTOP
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso visorcraft.com, webkitgtk.org, gtk.org, cairographics.org, libsoup.org, openssl.org, microsoft.com, webkit.org, vite.dev — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names visorcraft.com, webkitgtk.org, gtk.org, cairographics.org, libsoup.org, openssl.org, microsoft.com, webkit.org, vite.dev as well as its own vendor. The guard injects MONGRELDB_VIEWER_PASSWORD, MONGRELDB_VIEWER_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 88/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/regen-credits.sh:28 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.check_output(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/install-icons-linux.sh:70 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 0644 "$desktop_file"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src-tauri/src/commands/mod.rs:376 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networklet handle = mcp_server::start_http(executor, &host, port).await?;Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈40 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.