Skills/Glama/mobile-mcp

mobile-mcp@r1

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables an AI client to control an Android phone over Wi-Fi adb from a container or Kubernetes Pod, supporting actions such as tapping, typing, installing apps, opening URLs, and taking screenshots via Streamable HTTP." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher mouse9527 · publishing for 5 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 18 h ago
$npx skills add mobile-mcp
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
7 of 7 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
LEASE_TOKENSMOBILEMCP_AUTHMOBILEMCP_AUTH_DISABLEDConfiguration, not credentials: ADB_KEY_DIR, ADB_MDNS, ELEMENTS_TRIM, FAKE_PHONE_STATE, KEEPALIVE_SECONDS, LEASE_HOST, LEASE_INNER_LISTEN, LEASE_PORT, LEASE_UPSTREAM, MCP_LISTEN, MOBILEMCP_DISABLE_TELEMETRY, PHONE_ADB_PORTS, PHONE_ADDR, PHONE_LEASE, PHONE_WAKE, WAKE_ADB
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for LEASE_TOKENS, MOBILEMCP_AUTH, MOBILEMCP_AUTH_DISABLED and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is mobile-mcp@r1 safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 15 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.0sprocessexited 1: ./audit.sh: line 5: $1: unbound variable
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessexited 1: mobile-mcp-image: MOBILEMCP_AUTH is not set; refusing to start without authentication (set MOBILEMCP_AUTH_DISABLED=1 to allow)
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
15sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
15sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
15sprocessexited 1: ./smoke.sh: line 4: $1: unbound variable
15sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
15sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
15sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
15sprocess7 of 7 bundled scripts run with no arguments
15sprocessscript backend runs setup only
15sprocessscript backend runs setup only
15sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsmoke.sh:101 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsecho "$1" > "$WDIR/phone.json"; chmod 666 "$WDIR/phone.json"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsmoke/screen_test.js:37 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log("ok: element trimming (dedupe, zero-size, short id, centre, label==text, inputs / icons kept, batch, untouched otherwise)");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:18 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsaudit.sh:18 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfind "$ROOTFS" -xdev \( -name 'adbkey*' -o -name '.git' -o -name '.env' -o -name '.netrc' -o -name '.git-credentials' \Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsmoke.sh:99 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsWPORT=$((PORT + 3)); WDIR=$(mktemp -d); chmod 777 "$WDIR"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈38 tok
1 file · 16 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

mobile-mcp@r1 safety verdict: Verified (install only) — KillerSkills