Skills/Glama/mister-parc-mcp

mister-parc-mcp@0.2.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Read-only MCP access to a fleet's already-published state: dashboard key figures, the "À faire" to-do list, per-repository CI/alert/PR status, failure details, library lag, trends, and the shared dev-pwa-config socle's modules, reusable workflows and documentation. Lets any MCP client answer "what is left to do on the fleet?" and "does the socle already provide this?" without recopying the dashboard or duplicating the base code." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher mister-guiiug · publishing for 2 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 2d ago
$npx skills add mister-parc-mcp
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso githubusercontent.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 91/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_socle.py:71 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesawait client.call_tool("socle_doc", {"fichier": "../../etc/passwd"})Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

No other findings across 4,036 lines in 25 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈531 tok
2 files · 25 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.