Skills/Glama/messages-mcp

messages-mcp@0.1.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Enables a voice assistant to read, draft, and send SMS and chat messages through the user's own Matrix inbox, integrated as a claude-voice plugin." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher roykollensvendsen · publishing for 2 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 37 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso githubusercontent.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent; HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent; HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/messages_mcp/door_list.py:80 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsmsg = f"{path} can be read or changed by others; run chmod 600 on it"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/schema_pin.py:120 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesf" the file to tests/sms-since-answer.json with numbers written {PLACEHOLDER}, and put the new"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/ratchet.py:340 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesA step that hangs even so is ended by hand with `kill -9 -- -<its pid>`, which the ratchetFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/no_session_links.py:61 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/ratchet.py:359 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processessys.stderr.write(f"stopping {command[0]}; if it hangs, end it with: kill -9 -- -{step.pid}\n")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/imperative.py:161 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/mutate.py:359 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# A kill by some other test is not evidence about this rule.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/own_code.py:29 · Python subprocess execution detectedasked = subprocess.run([python, "-c", ASK], cwd=root, env=env, capture_output=True, text=True, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentREADME.md:24 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentMade by scripts/docs.py from docs/setup.md. Change the guide, then run it.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/messages_mcp/door_cert.py:37 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(command, check=False).returncode # noqa: S603Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/schema_pin.py:163 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(argv, check=True, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=GH_TIMEOUT).stdoutFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/readable.py:101 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/red_first.py:250 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["uv", "sync", "--locked", "--all-extras", "--quiet"], cwd=tree, env=env, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentREADME.md:246 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentnot run: these are the gates; running them from a gate would recurseFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/private_data_scan.py:102 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(["git", *args], cwd=ROOT, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True).stdoutFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentREADME.md:275 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentnot run: these clean up a worktree, so they would remove the one the docs check runs inFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/red_first.py:53 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/mutate.py:262 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# turns colour back on, which would otherwise make every kill unattributable.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/ratchet.py:346 · Python subprocess execution detectedstep = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detectedsrc/messages_mcp/service.py:37 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsQUOTES = str.maketrans(dict.fromkeys('\u201c\u201d"\u00ab\u00bb\u201e\u2039\u203a\u201a\u2018\u2019`', "'"))Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/mutate.py:239 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/red_first.py:237 · Python subprocess execution detectedcode = subprocess.run(args, cwd=tree, env=env, check=False).returncodeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/mutate.py:15 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesA kill is not enough on its own. A mutation breaks whatever it breaks, and itFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈40 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim roykollensvendsen: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
Publish a new version to Glama, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim roykollensvendsenPropose a patch to the maintainer