mcpserver@r1

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Turns a Frappe site into a remote MCP server that AI clients such as Claude can sign in to with OAuth and use curated, task-level tools registered by installed apps. Every call runs as the signed-in user with that user's permissions, with schema-checked arguments and rollback on failure." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher effizienzagent · publishing for 0 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 2 h ago

$npx skills add mcpserver

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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.

Tested: every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested: use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for: no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to: no vendor host named in the codeAlso claude.ai, claude.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw: no credential files read · no network
What we could not test: use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is mcpserver@r1 safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations

t+CategoryObserved action

0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle

0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only

0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM

Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/test.yml:73 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt-get install -y mariadb-clientFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.

AST05

MEDIUM

MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)SKILL.md:5 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkMCP server EffizienzAgent/mcpserver on Glama, built from https://github.com/EffizienzAgent/mcpserver.Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.

AST04

HIGH

Access to sensitive file pathsrenovate.json:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"managerFilePatterns": ["/^\\.github/versions\\.env$/"],Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.

AST05

MEDIUM

Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/test.yml:72 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt-get updateFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.

AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded

≈36 tok

1 file · 31 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.