mcp-whmcs@0.1.0
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Enables Claude or any MCP client to manage WHMCS clients, services, orders, invoices, quotes, domains, tickets and system settings through the WHMCS External API, with 128 typed tools plus a generic caller for any of the 162 API actions. Includes read-only mode, confirmation prompts for destructive operations, and opt-in gating for sensitive actions." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
WHMCS_ACCESS_KEYWHMCS_API_SECRETWHMCS_PASSWORDWHMCS_PASSWORD_IS_MD5WHMCS_SECRETConfiguration, not credentials: WHMCS_ALLOW_SENSITIVE, WHMCS_API_IDENTIFIER, WHMCS_API_URL, WHMCS_IDENTIFIER, WHMCS_MAX_RESPONSE_CHARS, WHMCS_READ_ONLY, WHMCS_TIMEOUT_MS, WHMCS_TOOLSETS, WHMCS_URL, WHMCS_USER_AGENT, WHMCS_USERNAME- Where it talks to
- whmcs.com, your-whmcs.com (its own)Also eslint.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names eslint.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects WHMCS_ACCESS_KEY, WHMCS_API_SECRET, WHMCS_PASSWORD, WHMCS_PASSWORD_IS_MD5, WHMCS_SECRET only into requests to whmcs.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
"build": "bun build src/index.ts --target node --format esm --minify --outfile dist/index.js && chmod +x dist/index.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.* Live tests against the WHMCS instance configured in `.env` (Bun loads it automatically).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.env: { ...env, WHMCS_READ_ONLY: 'true', WHMCS_ALLOW_SENSITIVE: 'false' },Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.