mcp-video-learn@0.7.0
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "Enables an LLM to actually watch videos, GIFs, animated WebP and static images by sampling scene-change frames into a single grid image alongside any available subtitle text, including Bilibili videos fetched through the official API. It also exposes metadata-only lookups for deciding whether a video is worth watching and a recent-frames mode for seeing how a clip ends." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Server started and answered tools/list.- Tested
- MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso bilibili.com, gstatic.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it under the guard; read the third-party hosts first. The code names bilibili.com, gstatic.com as well as its own vendor. The guard pins the network to the hosts the honeypot saw.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 25 s · 2 scenariosStatic findings
const deny = await client.callTool({ name: 'media_frames', arguments: { input: '/etc/passwd' } });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.sudo apt-get install -y -qq ffmpegFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo apt-get update -qqFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.ok('白名单外路径被拒', isUnderRoots('/etc/passwd', [outDir]) === false);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim hoholi-668: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.