Is mcp-twake-chat@0.6.0 safe to install?

mcp-twake-chat@0.6.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables AI assistants to securely access and interact with Twake Chat and other Matrix homeservers, including end-to-end encrypted rooms, through tools for rooms, messages, threads, unread messages, mentions, people, attachments, drafts, and optional sending." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher linagora · publishing for 7 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 6d ago

$npx skills add mcp-twake-chat

Watch Report an issue

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.

Tested: every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested: use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for: MATRIX_ACCESS_TOKENMATRIX_CREDENTIALS_FILEMATRIX_TOKEN_COMMANDMCP_HTTP_TOKEN_FILEConfiguration, not credentials: LIVE_QUERY, LIVE_READ_ROOM, LIVE_ROOM, MATRIX_APPROVAL, MATRIX_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_MS, MATRIX_DEVICE_ID, MATRIX_DOWNLOAD_DIR, MATRIX_DRAFTS_ROOM_NAME, MATRIX_E2EE_RECOVERY, MATRIX_HOMESERVER_URL, MATRIX_RECOVERY_KEY_FILE, MATRIX_SEARCH_BACKFILL_DAYS, MATRIX_SEARCH_INDEX, MATRIX_SEND_SCOPE, MATRIX_STORE_DIR, MATRIX_STORE_KEY_FILE, MATRIX_TIMEOUT_MS, MATRIX_UPLOAD_DIR, MATRIX_USER_ID, MCP_HTTP_HOST, MCP_HTTP_PORT, MCP_TRANSPORT, MCP_URL, SMOKE_ROOM_QUERY, SMOKE_USER_QUERY, TOM_URL, USER_LANGUAGE, USER_TIMEZONE
Where it talks to: no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw: no credential files read · no network
What we could not test: use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for MATRIX_ACCESS_TOKEN, MATRIX_CREDENTIALS_FILE, MATRIX_TOKEN_COMMAND, MCP_HTTP_TOKEN_FILE and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations

t+CategoryObserved action

0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle

0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only

0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH

Access to sensitive file pathssrc/config.ts:72 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv = { ...parseCredentialsFile(readFileSync(env.MATRIX_CREDENTIALS_FILE, 'utf8')), ...env };Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.

AST05

MEDIUM

Access to sensitive file pathstests/files.test.ts:21 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesexpect(safeName('../../etc/passwd')).toBe('passwd');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.

AST05

MEDIUM

MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/http.ts:53 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkexport function createMcpHttpHandler(newServer: () => McpServer, opts: HttpOptions) {Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.

AST04

MEDIUM

File permission modification commandsrc/store.ts:62 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsif (mode & 0o077) throw new Error(`${file} is readable by group/others (mode ${mode.toString(8)}): chmod 0600 it`);Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.

AST05

MEDIUM

File type combined with upload actionsrc/search-index.ts:76 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files

const ins = this.db.prepare('INSERT INTO msg (body, event_id, room_id, sender, sender_name, ts, thread_root) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)');

Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.

AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded

≈37 tok

1 file · 49 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.