Skills/Glama/mcp-tta

mcp-tta@0.1.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables search, detailed retrieval, and Markdown full-text access for Korean ICT standards and technical reports (TTAS/TTAR), including statistics and paginated document extraction." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher koreapyj · publishing for 12 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 1 h ago
$npx skills add mcp-tta
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
2 of 2 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
TTA_API_KEY
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso or.kr — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names or.kr as well as its own vendor. The guard injects TTA_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 88/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1snetworkCONNECT tcp://127.0.0.1:3000 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.1sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.3sprocess2 of 2 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/parsers.test.ts:150 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert.throws(() => encodeFilename("../etc/passwd"));Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

No other findings across 7,719 lines in 27 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈32 tok
1 file · 27 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.