Skills/Glama/mcp-studio

mcp-studio@1.0.1

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "Enables AI assistants to turn OpenAPI/REST specs, local CLI binaries, and Windows desktop apps into tested, installable MCP server repositories. It also inspects targets, runs generated handshake tests with schema token estimates, registers projects into local AI clients, and launches a local web workbench." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher deusbr · publishing for 0 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 1 h ago
$npx skills add mcp-studio
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Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso httpbin.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it under the guard. Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 20 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
20sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · (node:2819) [UNDICI-EHPA] Warning: EnvHttpProxyAgent is experimental, expect them to change at any time. (Use `node --trace-warnings ...` to show where the warning was created) Usage: mcp-studio <web|mcp|install|status|templates|scan-windows|from-openapi|from-cli|from-windows|test|install-generated>
20sprocessscript backend runs setup only
20sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathslib/installers.cjs:91 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileslines.push('', `[mcp_servers.${safeName}.env]`);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathslib/installers.cjs:78 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst nextTop = after.search(/\r?\n\[(?!mcp_servers\.(?:"[^"]+"|'[^']+'|[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+)\.env\])[^\]]+\]/);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionbin/mcp-studio.cjs:65 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify(store.createProject(bp, { outputDir: opts.out }), null, 2));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionbin/mcp-studio.cjs:70 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify(store.createProject(bp, { outputDir: opts.out }), null, 2));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionbin/mcp-studio.cjs:75 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify(store.createProject(bp, { outputDir: opts.out }), null, 2));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈459 tok
1 file · 16 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

mcp-studio@1.0.1 safety verdict: Verified (startup only) — KillerSkills