Skills/Glama/mcp-persistence

mcp-persistence@0.3.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Provides durable JSON document storage with immutable revisions, idempotent writes, and streamed binary artifact upload/download for MCP clients, with broker-mediated access control." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher pandagaume · publishing for 12 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 12d ago
$npx skills add mcp-persistence
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MCP_PERSISTENCE_PROVIDER_SECRETMCP_PERSISTENCE_VAULT_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_PERSISTENCE_ALLOW_FILE_SYNC_ONLY, MCP_PERSISTENCE_BROKER_URL, MCP_PERSISTENCE_DATA, MCP_PERSISTENCE_LOCALE, MCP_PERSISTENCE_RESOURCE_ROOT, MCP_PERSISTENCE_SQL_TARGETS, MCP_PERSISTENCE_TRANSFER_PORT, MCP_PERSISTENCE_VAULT_PREFIX, MCP_PERSISTENCE_VAULT_SLOT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for MCP_PERSISTENCE_PROVIDER_SECRET, MCP_PERSISTENCE_VAULT_TOKEN and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/sqlite/sqlite.persistence.store.ts:240 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesif (Number(this.db.prepare("SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM uploads WHERE subject=? AND state IN ('pending','complete')").get(context.subject)!.n) >= 4) fail("quota_exceeded", "Too many active uploads");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/registry.test.ts:29 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesexpect(readFileSync(join(root, "connections.sqlite")).includes(Buffer.from("persistence/postgres"))).toBe(true);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/sqlite/sqlite.persistence.store.ts:293 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesthis.db.prepare("UPDATE uploads SET state='committed',size=0,expires=? WHERE ns=? AND id=?").run(Date.now() + this.limits.idempotencyRetentionSeconds * 1000, request.namespace, request.uploadId);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/sqlite/sqlite.persistence.store.ts:249 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconst row = this.db.prepare("SELECT * FROM uploads WHERE ns=? AND id=? AND subject=?").get(namespace, id, context.subject);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/sqlite/sqlite.persistence.store.ts:243 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…nce: request.provenance, createdAt: new Date().toISOString() }; this.db.prepare("INSERT INTO uploads VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)").run(request.namespace, upload.uploadId, upload.artifactId, context.subject, canonical(metadata), request.size, D…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/sqlite/sqlite.persistence.store.ts:277 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesthis.db.prepare("UPDATE uploads SET state='complete' WHERE ns=? AND id=?").run(request.namespace, request.uploadId);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈304 tok
2 files · 48 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.