mcp-legifrance@r1
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Enables read-only querying of official French law — laws, codes, case law, CNIL deliberations and collective agreements — through the Légifrance PISTE API, returning source text with citations and links. It also resolves and verifies legal citations, compares article versions, and searches across multiple legal collections." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso gouv.fr, evil.example, crates.io, rust-lang.org, app.test, proxy.example — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is mcp-legifrance@r1 safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 74/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
"packaging/mcpb/manifest.json: input/output error",Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why."legi/../etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose..env("FR_ELI_ENV", "production")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."������&#+65;&#x+41;&#x;&#X;&#;a;&#xg;";Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own..env("RUST_LOG", "trace")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.assert_eq!(doc_for_key("../etc/passwd"), None);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."tests/tools.lock.json: input/output error"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why..env("FR_ELI_CACHE_DIR", " ")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.assert!(status.success(), "kill -{signal} a échoué");Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."http://uinfo-name:[email protected]/x",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."https://uinfo-name:[email protected]/x",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose..env(CLIENT_ID, CHILD_MARKER)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.assert_eq!(decode_entities("ééééé"), "ééééé");Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.format!("packaging/mcpb/manifest.json: input/output error\n{UPDATE_HINT}")Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why..env(CLIENT_SECRET, " child-secret ")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.(LockMode::Update, LOCK_PATH, false, "tests/tools.lock.json: input/output error"),Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why..envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose..env("TLS_PROBE_CHILD", "1")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.(LockMode::Check, LOCK_PATH, false, "tests/tools.lock.json: input/output error"),Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why..args(["-c", &format!("kill -{signal} {}", std::process::id())])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell..env("TZ", tz)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
6 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim muchiny: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
- Excessive HTML entities detected≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.