Skills/Glama/marketing-lab-mcp

marketing-lab-mcp@0.1.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables Claude to run nine marketing calculations on real public data — A/B test evaluation and planning, email campaign analysis, budget simulation and optimization, store sales breakdowns, RFM customer segmentation, lead funnel analysis, and multi-model attribution comparison. It connects without an account and returns a short summary plus structured numbers so decisions rest on computed results rather than guesses." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher hysmarcos · publishing for 3 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 3d ago
$npx skills add marketing-lab-mcp
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso kaggle.com, creativecommons.org, workers.dev, claude.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

LOW
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentsite/index.html:226 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent · informational: not an instruction filebiome-ignore lint/a11y/noRedundantRoles: Safari drops list semantics when list-style is noneFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentsite/index.html:27 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent · informational: not an instruction filebiome-ignore lint/a11y/noRedundantRoles: Safari drops list semantics when list-style is noneFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/screenshot.mjs:4 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code// npx vite build && npx vite preview --port 4173Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Cross-server tool referencetests/scripts/stream-to-transcript.test.ts:137 · Cross-server tool reference — agent may chain tools across untrusted MCP servers"a tool from another server",Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Image alt text carrying instructionsREADME.md:10 · Image alt text carrying instructionsThe demo page: a recorded conversation with Claude, and a tool call re-run in the browser that matches the recordingFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
HTML that renders invisible but is read by the agentsite/index.html:98 · HTML that renders invisible but is read by the agent · informational: not an instruction file<div class="how__server"> <code class="how__call">createServer()</code> <span class="how__count">9 tools</span> <!-- biome-ignore lint/a11y/noRedundantRoles: SaFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentsite/index.html:102 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent · informational: not an instruction filebiome-ignore lint/a11y/noRedundantRoles: Safari drops list semantics when list-style is noneFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentsite/index.html:162 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent · informational: not an instruction filebiome-ignore lint/a11y/noRedundantRoles: Safari drops list semantics when list-style is noneFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈40 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.