Skills/Glama/mailbox-mcp-server

mailbox-mcp-server@1.3.0

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "Enables each user to securely sign in with their own IMAP/SMTP mailbox and read, search, send, and organize email from Claude." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher mustafa-mph · publishing for 0 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 1 h ago
$npx skills add mailbox-mcp-server
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Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MCP_AUTH_TOKENSESSION_SECRETConfiguration, not credentials: BRAND_NAME, OWNER_ACCOUNTS, PUBLIC_BASE_URL, SESSION_FILE, TRUST_PROXY_HOPS, USER_IMAP_HOST, USER_IMAP_PORT, USER_IMAP_SECURE, USER_MAIL_DOMAIN, USER_SMTP_HOST, USER_SMTP_PORT, USER_SMTP_SECURE
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for MCP_AUTH_TOKEN, SESSION_SECRET and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 26 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
5.8sprocessdependency install exit 0
26sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · (node:5234) [UNDICI-EHPA] Warning: EnvHttpProxyAgent is experimental, expect them to change at any time. (Use `node --trace-warnings ...` to show where the warning was created) Nothing to serve: set USER_IMAP_HOST (per-user sign-in) and/or OWNER_ACCOUNTS. See .env.example.
26sprocessscript backend runs setup only
26sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker-compose.yml:9 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file: .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsindex.js:62 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconsole.error("Nothing to serve: set USER_IMAP_HOST (per-user sign-in) and/or OWNER_ACCOUNTS. See .env.example.");Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsindex.js:5 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesdotenv.config({ path: path.join(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), ".env") });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)SKILL.md:5 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkMCP server mustafa-mph/mailbox-mcp-server on Glama, built from https://github.com/mustafa-mph/mailbox-mcp-server.Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionindex.js:579 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesres.status(405).json({ error: "Method not allowed (stateless server, use POST)" });Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈42 tok
1 file · 10 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

mailbox-mcp-server@1.3.0 safety verdict: Verified (startup only) — KillerSkills