Skills/Glama/lore

lore@0.2.1

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables AI agents to search and ask questions across versioned service documentation, retrieve documents and diffs, and find related docs with cited answers over Streamable HTTP, SSE, or stdio." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher ai-pipes · publishing for 3 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 3d ago
$npx skills add lore
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
DATABASE_URLLLM_API_KEYLORE_ADMIN_PASSWORDLORE_API_KEYLORE_CLI_TOKEN_TTL_DAYSLORE_DEVICE_COOKIE_SECRETLORE_EMBEDDING_API_KEYLORE_MCP_API_KEYLORE_TOKENMAX_CLI_TOKEN_TTL_DAYSMIN_API_KEY_LENGTHMIN_PASSWORD_LENGTHOPENAI_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: GIT_BRANCH, LLM_BASE_URL, LLM_MODEL, LORE_ADMIN_LOGIN, LORE_ALLOWED_ORIGINS, LORE_COOKIE_SECURE, LORE_EMBEDDING_BASE_URL, LORE_EMBEDDING_MODEL, LORE_EMBEDDING_PROVIDER, LORE_HOST, LORE_MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS, LORE_MCP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS, LORE_MCP_HOST, LORE_MCP_PORT, LORE_MCP_PUBLIC_URL, LORE_MIGRATIONS_DIR, LORE_PORT, LORE_READ_KEY, LORE_SSO_SESSION_MAX_HOURS, LORE_TRUST_PROXY, LORE_URL, LORE_VENDOR_DIR, OIDC_ALLOW_INSECURE, OIDC_ISSUER, OIDC_SCOPES, PUBLIC_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for DATABASE_URL, LLM_API_KEY, LORE_ADMIN_PASSWORD, LORE_API_KEY, LORE_CLI_TOKEN_TTL_DAYS, LORE_DEVICE_COOKIE_SECRET, LORE_EMBEDDING_API_KEY, LORE_MCP_API_KEY, LORE_TOKEN, MAX_CLI_TOKEN_TTL_DAYS, MIN_API_KEY_LENGTH, MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH, OPENAI_API_KEY and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/demo-credentials.ts:5 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* one in the credentials file, so the local `LORE_API_KEY` from `.env` cannot reach another server.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/cli/images.ts:66 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`Uploaded: ${json.filename}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/cli/push.ts:387 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`Uploading ${toUpload.length} documents${unchangedCount > 0 ? ` (${unchangedCount} unchanged)` : ''}...`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/test-search-pipeline.ts:28 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log('LLM output :', searchTerms);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/platform/config.ts:3 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* in .env.example and the README "Configuration" table.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/demo-credentials.ts:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst { token } = resolveCredentials({ url }, { ...env, LORE_TOKEN: env.LORE_TOKEN || env.LORE_API_KEY }, home);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/demo.ts:5 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* npm run demo # http://localhost:4737, LORE_API_KEY from .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈30 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.