Skills/Glama/llmmcp

llmmcp@0.1.2

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Enables agents to run Google-first web searches with Bing and Google News fallbacks, and to fetch web pages as markdown, text, or raw HTML through an enterprise proxy with corporate TLS validation. Provides proxy, TLS, browser, and connectivity diagnostics without requiring search-provider API keys." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher ai-v5 · publishing for 10 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 54 min ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso bing.com, google.com, python.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 74/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Credential pass-through configuration; URL with embedded credentials; URL with embedded credentials. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationAGENTS.md:34 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsbe printed, logged, stored in a report or committed. Never place a proxyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/llmmcp/browser.py:189 · Python subprocess execution detectedprocess = subprocess.Popen( # noqa: S603 - fixed binary, argument list, no shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/llmmcp/browser.py:225 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run( # noqa: S603 - fixed command, no shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtools/check_repo_hygiene.py:72 · Python subprocess execution detectedoutput = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialstools/check_repo_hygiene.py:12 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingPlaceholders such as ``http://user:secret@host:8080`` are intentional redactionFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialssrc/llmmcp/settings.py:16 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingThe proxy URL may carry credentials (``http://user:secret@host:port``); the rawFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_settings.py:115 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking"http": "http://user:secret@explicit:8080",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/fixtures/search/gnews_feed.xml:1 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking…generator>NFE/5.0</generator><title>"ascend npu mfu" - Google News</title><link>https://news.google.com/search?q=ascend+npu+mfu&amp;hl=en-US&amp;gl=US&amp;ceid=US:en</link><language>en-US</language><webMaster>[email protected]</web…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_settings.py:216 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking("http://user:[email protected]:8080", "http://proxy.corp:8080"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_settings.py:107 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingenviron={"LLMMCP_PROXY": "http://user:secret@explicit:8080", "HTTPS_PROXY": "http://env-proxy:3128"},Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_server.py:285 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingproxy=ProxySettings({"https": "http://alice:topsecret@gw:8080"}, source="LLMMCP_PROXY")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_browser.py:70 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingproxy = "http://alice:[email protected]:8080"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/test_http.py:298 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development target"http://10.20.30.40/docs",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/llmmcp/search/google.py:300 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesexcept Exception: # network hiccup must not kill the whole searchFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtools/mcp_smoke.py:32 · Python subprocess execution detectedself.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_browser.py:79 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingassert browser.browser_proxy("http://user:pw@p:8080") == "http://p:8080"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_fetch.py:203 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files@pytest.mark.parametrize("url", ["ftp://example.com/x", "file:///etc/passwd", "example.com/no-scheme"])Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_settings.py:112 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingassert settings.proxy.raw == "http://user:secret@explicit:8080"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_settings.py:116 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking"https": "http://user:secret@explicit:8080",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandpackages/dsh-web-mcp/index.js:1045 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// A hard host quit does not unwind effects, and only a synchronous killFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_http.py:259 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingproxy = ProxySettings(proxies={"https": "http://alice:hunter2@gateway:8080"}, source="LLMMCP_PROXY")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈745 tok
2 files · 56 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

6 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim ai-v5: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
Publish a new version to Glama, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim ai-v5Propose a patch to the maintainer