Skills/Glama/libre-mcp

libre-mcp@0.12.1

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Enables Claude and other MCP clients to query FreeStyle Libre sensor glucose read-only through LibreLinkUp, answering questions about current values, curves, time in range, typical days, lows and highs, and sensor lifespan. It keeps its own history of readings and all sensors worn, since LibreLinkUp only exposes the last 12 hours." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher mskerwiderski · publishing for 2 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 36 h ago
$npx skills add libre-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MYAUTH_APPMYAUTH_APP_KEYMYAUTH_PUBLIC_PORTMYAUTH_URLConfiguration, not credentials: FOOTER_NOTE, LIBRE_MCP_SESSION, LLU_VERSION, MCP_DB, POLL_INTERVAL_S
Where it talks to
libreview.io, libreview.ru, libreview.com (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for MYAUTH_APP, MYAUTH_APP_KEY, MYAUTH_PUBLIC_PORT, MYAUTH_URL and talks to libreview.io, libreview.ru, libreview.com. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets MYAUTH_APP=libreview.io,MYAUTH_APP_KEY=libreview.io,MYAUTH_PUBLIC_PORT=libreview.io,MYAUTH_URL=libreview.io -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)SKILL.md:5 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkMCP server mskerwiderski/MCPServerFreeStyleLibre on Glama, built from https://github.com/mskerwiderski/MCPServerFreeStyleLibre.Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
LOW
Authorization escalation languagedocs/install-chatgpt.md:25 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction fileIn ChatGPT: **Settings → Apps & Connectors → Advanced → Developer mode**.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectiondocs/install-chatgpt.md:14 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file- A ChatGPT plan that offers developer mode: Plus, Pro, Business, Enterprise orFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectiondocs/install-chatgpt.md:25 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction fileIn ChatGPT: **Settings → Apps & Connectors → Advanced → Developer mode**.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:116 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesinstance are environment variables (`.env.example`, docs/hosted.md).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Hidden zero-width characters detectedtests/test_csv.py:13 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content"Glukosewerte,Erstellt am,28-09-2026 08:00 UTC,Erstellt von,Max Muster\n"Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker-compose.yml:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file: ./.envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:63 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file| [Install for ChatGPT](docs/install-chatgpt.md) | Hosted only: developer mode, custom connector, troubleshooting |Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker-compose.yml:1 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# The hosted server in a container. Settings come from .env (see .env.exampleFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injectiondocs/install-chatgpt.md:23 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file## 4. Turn on developer modeFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languagedocs/install-chatgpt.md:23 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file## 4. Turn on developer modeFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:22 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsRUN useradd -u 1000 -m app && mkdir -p /data && chown app:app /dataFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.md:63 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file| [Install for ChatGPT](docs/install-chatgpt.md) | Hosted only: developer mode, custom connector, troubleshooting |Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languagedocs/install-chatgpt.md:14 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file- A ChatGPT plan that offers developer mode: Plus, Pro, Business, Enterprise orFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_access_copy.py:16 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run([str(SYNC), "--check", block, str(REPO / "libre_mcp")],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_local.py:169 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, "-m", "libre_mcp.cli", "stdio"], env=env,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,304 tok
2 files · 61 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.