larder@0.1.0
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Enables a voice assistant to keep a shared, persistent memory of a household's kitchen, turning spoken remarks into pantry updates, scaled recipes, a cart, and confirmed grocery orders. Household members can ask what can be made and for how many, review what is low or out, and place or restock simulated orders only after explicit confirmation." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
BLOB_READ_WRITE_TOKENLARDER_COOKIE_SECRETOPENROUTER_API_KEYVERCEL_AUTOMATION_BYPASS_SECRETConfiguration, not credentials: LARDER_DATA_DIR, LARDER_LLM_CALLS_PER_DAY, LARDER_LLM_MODELS, LARDER_SELF_URL, LARDER_TURNS_PER_VISITOR, VERCEL- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso openrouter.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names openrouter.ai as well as its own vendor. The guard injects BLOB_READ_WRITE_TOKEN, LARDER_COOKIE_SECRET, OPENROUTER_API_KEY, VERCEL_AUTOMATION_BYPASS_SECRET only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
No findings across 7,800 lines in 37 files.
Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.