Skills/Glama/kt-mcp

kt-mcp@0.1.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Enables MCP clients to manage a workspace through file reading, writing, editing, searching, Bash/Python execution, and job control, with optional desktop GUI and Cloudflare Tunnel access." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher dnlinyj · publishing for 1 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 13 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
KT_MCP_TOKENTUNNEL_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: SystemRoot
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso python.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names python.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects KT_MCP_TOKEN, TUNNEL_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 73/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: README links to a committed installer; Tunneling service URL. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/verify_onefile.py:185 · Python subprocess execution detectedf"subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, '-E', '-s', '-c', {descendant_code!r}], creationflags=subprocess.CREATE_NO_WINDOW); "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Tunneling service URLtests/integration/test_desktop_server.py:41 · Tunneling service URL — may route traffic to attacker infrastructuretunnel.url = "https://desktop-test.trycloudflare.com"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/verify_onefile.py:342 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
CRITICAL
README links to a committed installerREADME.md → start-gui.cmdstart-gui.cmdFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/verify_onefile.py:76 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesassert "onefile-ok" in (await call("read", {"path": "中文测试.txt"}))["output"]Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/integration/test_server.py:114 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files"original" in (await call("read", {"path": "existing.txt"}))["output"]Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Tunneling service URLtests/integration/test_desktop_server.py:59 · Tunneling service URL — may route traffic to attacker infrastructure"quick": "https://desktop-test.trycloudflare.com/mcp/" + token,Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/kt_mcp/tunnel.py:142 · Python subprocess execution detectedself.process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/build_onefile.py:70 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(command, cwd=ROOT, env=environment, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/verify_onefile.py:279 · Python subprocess execution detectedprocess = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/unit/test_auth.py:98 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking"https://u:[email protected]",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Tunneling service URLtests/unit/test_tunnel.py:86 · Tunneling service URL — may route traffic to attacker infrastructureassert tunnel.url == "https://sample-mcp.trycloudflare.com"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/unit/test_processes.py:41 · Python subprocess execution detectedf"subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, '-c', {child_source!r}]); "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Tunneling service URLtests/unit/test_tunnel.py:76 · Tunneling service URL — may route traffic to attacker infrastructurecode = "import time; print('https://sample-mcp.trycloudflare.com', flush=True); print('Registered tunnel connection', flush=True); time.sleep(30)"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Tunneling service URLsrc/kt_mcp/tunnel.py:16 · Tunneling service URL — may route traffic to attacker infrastructureQUICK_URL = re.compile(r"https://[a-z0-9]+(?:-[a-z0-9]+)*\.trycloudflare\.com\b")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈37 tok
1 file · 38 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

7 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. README links to a committed installer≈ +9 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim dnlinyj: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  4. Tunneling service URL≈ +2 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  5. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  6. URL with embedded credentials≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
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