kilobat@r1

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "A stdio MCP server exposing 43 tools that let AI agents diagnose and monitor a Mac's networking: which apps use bandwidth, Wi-Fi signal and channels, latency and packet loss, DNS and speed tests, why a host or API won't connect, whether traffic leaves via VPN, hotspot data budgets, and keeping the machine awake during long jobs. Read-only tools run without confirmation, while tools that change system settings prompt the agent to ask the user first." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher seifip · publishing for 2 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 2d ago

$npx skills add kilobat

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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.

Tested: every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested: use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for: no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to: kilobat.app (its own)Also malware.example — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw: no credential files read · no network
What we could not test: use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable and talks to kilobat.app, its own; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is kilobat@r1 safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations

t+CategoryObserved action

0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle

0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only

0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM

Python subprocess execution detectedscript/test_mcp.py:17 · Python subprocess execution detectedserver = subprocess.Popen([binary, "mcp"], stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, text=True, env=environment)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.

AST05

MEDIUM

Process kill commandscript/test_mcp.py:176 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# The kill switch: the saved settings always, the live state only from the running app (null otherwise).Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.

AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded

≈33 tok

1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.