Skills/Glama/kilnshell

kilnshell@1.0.5

CAUTION· startup only

Publisher claims: "Enables AI agents to access the local machine over MCP for terminal commands, file operations, code search, process management, and reading or editing PDF, Excel, and Word documents, with no telemetry." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher soflutionltd · publishing for 0 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 12 h ago

Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso desktopcommander.app, tally.so, google.com, claude.ai, run.app, openxmlformats.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it under the guard. Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 55 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
34sprocessdependency install exit 0
54sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · code: 'MODULE_NOT_FOUND', requireStack: [] } Node.js v22.23.5
54sprocessscript backend runs setup only
54sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/count-tokens.js:190 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify(output, null, 2));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/tools/pdf/markdown.ts:376 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesreturn { ...env, USERPROFILE: profileDir };Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpackage.json:35 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions…: "tsc && shx cp setup-claude-server.js uninstall-claude-server.js dist/ && shx chmod +x dist/*.js && shx mkdir -p dist/data && shx cp src/data/onboarding-prompts.jso…Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/npm-scripts/remote.ts:42 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx @wonderwhy-er/desktop-commander@latest remoteFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/build-mcpb.mjs:53 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted coderun(`npx -y @anthropic-ai/mcpb@2 validate "${join(out, 'manifest.json')}"`);Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/server.ts:656 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- Looking for configuration/setup files: ".env", "dockerfile", "tsconfig.json"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/command-manager.ts:225 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges// strip path prefix so /usr/bin/sudo gets caught as "sudo"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/build-mcpb.mjs:54 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted coderun(`npx -y @anthropic-ai/mcpb@2 pack "${out}" "${join(root, file)}"`);Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/tools/process.ts:94 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processescontent: [{ type: "text", text: `Error: Failed to kill process: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}` }],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/terminal-manager.ts:526 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// can never throw "Invalid string length" and kill the server.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/npm-scripts/remote.ts:43 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx @wonderwhy-er/desktop-commander@latest remote --debugFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/tools/schemas.ts:54 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// process.kill reads 0 and negative PIDs as process groups: 0 is the server'sFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/terminal-manager.ts:212 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// on Windows — used to kill the entire MCP server one tick AFTER thisFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/npm-scripts/remote.ts:44 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx @wonderwhy-er/desktop-commander@latest remote --logoutFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/utils/process-tree.ts:174 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes* Resolves once it is gone; throws what process.kill threw (ESRCH, EPERM), orFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/tools/filesystem.ts:94 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions` 4. File has restricted permissions (e.g. system file, locked by another process, or chmod 000).`,Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/terminal-manager.ts:308 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// has exited: Node also emits 'error' when a kill fails or a message can'tFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/npm-scripts/remote.ts:45 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx @wonderwhy-er/desktop-commander@latest remote --reportFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈35 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim soflutionltd: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  6. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
Publish a new version to Glama, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim soflutionltdPropose a patch to the maintainer