it-department@0.1.0
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Lets coding agents inspect fleet health, file and investigate bugs, request coordinated restarts, and claim, release, and resolve tickets in a shared incident queue without touching processes directly." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
DEEPSEEK_API_KEYIT_DESK_BEAT_SECRET_FILEIT_DESK_TOKENIT_DESK_TOKEN_FILEConfiguration, not credentials: BUILD_ARTIFACTSTAGINGDIRECTORY, CLAUDE_CODE_SESSION_ID, CONDUCTOR_URL, IT_DESK_AUDIT_LOG, IT_DESK_BUGS_DIR, IT_DESK_CLAUDE_PROJECTS, IT_DESK_DATA_DIR, IT_DESK_DB, IT_DESK_LEASE_BROKER_URL, IT_DESK_LOG_DIR, IT_DESK_PROVIDER_CHAIN, IT_DESK_REAPER_LOG, IT_DESK_SERVICES, IT_DESK_SETTINGS, IT_DESK_URL, IT_PRIME, SNAP, SNAP_REVISION, VSCODE_NLS_CONFIG- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso deepseek.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names deepseek.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects DEEPSEEK_API_KEY, IT_DESK_BEAT_SECRET_FILE, IT_DESK_TOKEN, IT_DESK_TOKEN_FILE only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationst+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run
Static findings
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_xss.py:280 · Python subprocess execution detected
AST05out = subprocess.run(["node", "-e", script], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30, # spawn-hidden-ok: short-lived test child, captured outputFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addresstests/test_heartbeat.py:46 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filtering
AST07"url": "http://100.64.0.9:8080/beat",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.MEDIUM
Discord webhook URLtests/test_hardening.py:147 · Discord webhook URL — data will be sent to Discord
AST07s["discord"] = {"webhook_url": "https://discord.com/api/webhooks/real/secret"}Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedapp/procs.py:99 · Python subprocess execution detected
AST05out = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/kill_witness.py:34 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes
AST05python kill takes the witness down in the same sweep it exists to witness.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/kill_witness.py:205 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes
AST05# parent alive-or-dead splits cascade/teardown from targeted killFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.MEDIUM
Process kill commandapp/monitor.py:19 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes
AST05# stalled /api/health long enough for keepalive to killFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.MEDIUM
Process kill commandapp/remediate.py:130 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes
AST05"""Drain (if supported), take the restart lease, kill ALL kill_matchFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.HIGH
document.cookie accessweb/vendor/xterm.js:1 · document.cookie access — can steal session cookies
AST07…+=String.fromCharCode(s[e]);return i}(e))},t.getCookieValue=function(e){const t=document.cookie.match("(^|[^;]+)\\s*"+e+"\\s*=\\s*([^;]+)");return t?t.pop():void 0},t.h=functi…Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/kill_witness.py:11 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes
AST0515 -> psutil kill / SIGTERM (the IT desk's own restarts)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedapp/prime.py:333 · Python subprocess execution detected
AST05r = subprocess.run(["powershell.exe", "-NoProfile", "-NonInteractive", "-Command", ps],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.MEDIUM
Process kill commandapp/storm.py:214 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes
AST05"sessions likely lost their MCP children (mass-kill after-image "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedapp/triage.py:82 · Python subprocess execution detected
AST05proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.MEDIUM
Process kill commandapp/procs.py:179 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes
AST05# we restart with a HARD kill (proc.kill() = TerminateProcess), which discardsFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedapp/cli_version.py:50 · Python subprocess execution detected
AST05r = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.MEDIUM
Process kill commandapp/storm.py:24 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes
AST05sessions run = sessions lost their MCP children (mass-kill after-image or MCPFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/kill_witness.py:297 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes
AST05# (a bind failure must not kill the witness)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.MEDIUM
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addresstests/test_heartbeat.py:46 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot name
AST07"url": "http://100.64.0.9:8080/beat",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionweb/vendor/xterm.js:1 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files
AST07…Service.options.logger?.trace.bind(this._optionsService.options.logger)??console.log,e,t)}debug(e,...t){this._logLevel<=o.LogLevelEnum.DEBUG&&this._log(this._optionsService.options.logger?.debug.bind(this._optionsService.options.logger)??c…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedapp/procs.py:188 · Python subprocess execution detected
AST05proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.MEDIUM
Process kill commandtests/test_lease_reclaim.py:128 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes
AST05"""port_owners is stubbed per-test; make sure the psutil kill path inFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/kill_witness.py:80 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes
AST0515: "psutil kill / SIGTERM (IT desk's own restarts)",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Instructions loaded
≈33 tok
1 file · 75 in bundle
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.