icyloom@2.2.2
CAUTION· startup onlyPublisher claims: "A local gateway that caches LLM prompts and tool results, stores searchable compressed context, and relays downstream MCP tools under deny-by-default rules. It keeps everything in one SQLite database with a single ledger tracking tokens paid upstream versus tokens avoided, plus a web console for live metrics." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso python.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it under the guard. Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 21 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
command: npxFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.r"[!?.,;:'\"`\u00b4\u201c\u201d\u2018\u2019\u00ab\u00bb\u00a1\u00bf\u2026]", re.UNICODEFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.stack = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.r"|\.env|ssh key)\b"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.command: npxFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.out = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.command: npxFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.server = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.stack = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.out = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.command: npxFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.subprocess.run([candidate, "--version"], capture_output=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.trap 'kill $SERVE_PID 2>/dev/null || true' EXITFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.command: npxFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.self.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.out = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.completed = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 - liste d'arguments, jamais de shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.stack = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.stack = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.stack = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run([node, "--check", str(tmp)], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim mlkblk-it: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Unicode escape sequence detected≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.