Skills/Glama/ibara

ibara@r1

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables agents to take over a spare Omarchy computer — its desktop, browser and apps — over the user's own Tailscale network to run tasks and return screenshots, reports and files. Users can watch the screen, send files and take control from a console in the bar." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher mayberrydt · publishing for 5 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 5d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is ibara@r1 safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 62/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Destructive command against a filesystem root or device. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/entry/admin.rs:637 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files("amend_delivery", &["task_1", "d1", "1", "host_12345678", "/tmp/../etc/passwd"]),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/storage/tests.rs:162 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesstd::os::unix::fs::symlink("/etc/passwd", ws.join("link")).unwrap();Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicesrc/desktop/idle.rs:227 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or device…cho '{{\"enabled\":false}}'; fi;;\n stay-awake) touch \"$flag\";;\n allow-idle) rm -f \"$flag\";;\n *) exit 2;;\nesac\n", flag.display() ), …Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/access_system.rs:343 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif enroll_keys(&mut inventory, request.get("keys"), &std::fs::read_to_string("/etc/passwd")?)? {Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/power_system.rs:304 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileslet passwd = std::fs::read_to_string("/etc/passwd").map_err(|_| "The account list could not be read.".to_string())?;Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/entry/admin.rs:465 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileslet passwd = String::from_utf8_lossy(&std::fs::read("/etc/passwd").unwrap_or_default()).into_owned();Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/server/peer.rs:34 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesSystemDb { passwd: "/etc/passwd".into(), group: "/etc/group".into() }Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/power_system.rs:357 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges// A run that crashed must not leave the desktop account's sudo open.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/desktop/cua.rs:2067 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesassert!(lines(dir.join("landed.log")).is_empty(), "no input after the handoff");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/install/user.rs:34 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges/// `sudo ibara system ARGS…` with this terminal, so sudo asks once.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/access_system.rs:126 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesstd::fs::read_to_string("/etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/install/user.rs:496 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges_ => "Tailscale is not answering. Start it with: sudo systemctl enable --now tailscaled, then run: tailscale up".into(),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/install/user.rs:3 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges//! system parts go through one `sudo ibara system …` (one password prompt).Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/power_system.rs:310 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files.ok_or_else(|| format!("Account {} is not in /etc/passwd.", cred.uid))Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/desktop/run.rs:704 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files.env("DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS", format!("unix:path={}/bus", dir.display())),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/power_system.rs:22 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files//! (`SO_PEERCRED`, named through `/etc/passwd`), and relay its JSON report.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/entry/admin.rs:446 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files/// (`agent_account`) and `/etc/passwd`.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Image alt text carrying instructionsconsole-plugin/README.md:47 · Image alt text carrying instructionsAn approval waiting: the toast with Approve, Deny and Always Allow, its desktop notification, and the count on the bar markFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/storage/tests.rs:149 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfor path in ["../secret", "a/../../secret", "..", "/etc/passwd", "a\\b", "x\u{1}y"] {Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedsrc/desktop/idle.rs:227 · Destructive file system command detected…cho '{{\"enabled\":false}}'; fi;;\n stay-awake) touch \"$flag\";;\n allow-idle) rm -f \"$flag\";;\n *) exit 2;;\nesac\n", flag.display() ),…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/desktop/run.rs:703 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files.env("XDG_RUNTIME_DIR", &dir)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandskills/ibara/SKILL.md:112 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes…aves the computer unavailable with recovery guidance; do not bypass it or force-kill the browser. Save/deliver needed files before finish. Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/desktop/cua.rs:363 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files.env("CUA_DRIVER_RS_ENABLE_WAYLAND", "1")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/storage/tests.rs:694 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfor dest in ["relative/path", "/home/riley/../etc/passwd", "/home//riley/x"] {Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/harness/mod.rs:499 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data fileslet mut begin = json!({ "goal": "Write approval.txt in the task workspace and send it to the computer the agent works from.", "request_id": rid("begin") });Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:24 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file- your own account with sudo access on each computerFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/install/user.rs:788 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// SAFETY: kill only sends a signal to this test's own stand-in.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/install/user.rs:732 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill -TERM "$pid"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/install/user.rs:714 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processespid=$(cat "$d/running" 2>/dev/null) && kill -0 "$pid" 2>/dev/null || { echo "omarchy-shell is not running" >&2; exit 1; }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/storage/tests.rs:709 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesassert_eq!(code(s.transfer("hazel", &ack("/home/riley/Downloads/report.txt", 2), None)), "POSTCONDITION_FAILED");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/storage/tests.rs:710 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesassert_eq!(code(s.transfer("hazel", &ack("tmp/report.txt", 1), None)), "POSTCONDITION_FAILED");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/desktop/mod.rs:1797 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions.args(["-c", "cat >\"$1\" && chmod 700 \"$1\"", "sh"])Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/install/user.rs:722 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif pid=$(cat "$d/running" 2>/dev/null) && kill -0 "$pid" 2>/dev/null; then echo "[{\"pid\": $pid}]"; else echo "No running instances"; fiFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,296 tok
1 file · 80 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

18 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim mayberrydt: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
Publish a new version to Glama, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim mayberrydtPropose a patch to the maintainer