Skills/Glama/human-verification

human-verification@r1

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables AI agents to submit intents and claims for real human review, returning true, false, or refined free-text corrections through a durable x402-paid workflow with polling and optional callbacks." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher jyharju-code · publishing for 3 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 3d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
CDP_API_KEY_IDCDP_API_KEY_SECRETCORE_INTERNAL_SECRETDASHBOARD_TOKENDATABASE_URLTELEGRAM_BOT_TOKENTELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_SECRETConfiguration, not credentials: ADMIN_TELEGRAM_ID, BASE_RPC_URL, BOT_LISTEN, BOT_MODE, BOT_PORT, CORE_API_PORT, FACILITATOR_ADDRESS, FACILITATOR_URL, FREE_COMMISSION_USD, FREE_DAILY_MAX, FX_ECB_URL, FX_STALE_DAYS, GAS_ALERT_INTERVAL_S, GAS_LOW_ETH, MAX_PENDING_TOTAL, MCP_PORT, PAYOUTS_AUTO, PUBLIC_BASE_URL, REQUEST_AUDIT_RETENTION_DAYS, SETUP_PK, VERIFY_API_URL, X402_NETWORK, X402_PAY_TO, X402_UNLOCK_PRICE
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso verifi.cloud, x402.org, base.org, europa.eu, ecb.int, telegram.org, basescan.org, githubusercontent.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names verifi.cloud, x402.org, base.org, europa.eu, ecb.int, telegram.org, basescan.org, githubusercontent.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects CDP_API_KEY_ID, CDP_API_KEY_SECRET, CORE_INTERNAL_SECRET, DASHBOARD_TOKEN, DATABASE_URL, TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN, TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_SECRET only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is human-verification@r1 safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/go-live.sh:3 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code# curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/jyharju-code/verifi/main/scripts/go-live.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscore/config.py:3 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesLoad order: process env wins, then .env in the repo root (dev convenience).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/verifi-ops.sh:7 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# 3. .env is immutable (chattr +i) outside env-set.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/go-live.sh:19 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesecho "== 3/6 Force-syncing to origin/main (.env is gitignored, so it is untouched) =="Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscore/wallets.py:60 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescompose file or .env leaked one into the wrong container.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:43 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- .env on the server is immutable (chattr) outside `verifi env-set`.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Telegram Bot API URLcore/notify.py:16 · Telegram Bot API URL — data will be sent to Telegram_API = "https://api.telegram.org/bot{token}/{method}"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/go-live.sh:4 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Force-syncs /root/verifi to origin/main (.env is gitignored, so untouched),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/acceptance-logging.sh:81 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesdocker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.yml --env-file .env --profile edge up -d --force-recreate nginx >/dev/null 2>&1Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLscripts/go-live.sh:3 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code source# curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/jyharju-code/verifi/main/scripts/go-live.sh | bashFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscore/config.py:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesload_dotenv(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/verifi-ops.sh:34 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileschattr -i .env 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/verifi-remote.sh:39 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x /usr/local/bin/verifiFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/verifi-ops.sh:28 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesget_env() { grep -s "^$1=" .env | head -1 | cut -d= -f2- || true; }Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/go-live.sh:23 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionscp scripts/verifi-ops.sh /usr/local/bin/verifi && chmod +x /usr/local/bin/verifiFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/verifi-ops.sh:30 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# The single writer for .env. Lifts the immutability bit, writes one key,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/verifi-ops.sh:14 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesCOMPOSE="docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.yml --env-file .env --profile bot --profile edge --profile payments"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/go-live.sh:3 · Remote installer piped to shell# curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/jyharju-code/verifi/main/scripts/go-live.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagetests/test_earnings.py:151 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeself.assertIn("npx awal send $0.58 0x4444444444444444444444444444444444444444", report)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdeploy/docker-compose.yml:2 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Run from the repo root: docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.yml --env-file /root/verifi/.env ...Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈598 tok
2 files · 78 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim jyharju-code: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Telegram Bot API URL≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  5. Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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