Skills/Glama/heros-firewall

heros-firewall@0.2.0

CAUTION· startup only

Publisher claims: "Enables agents to route MCP tool calls through an inline policy proxy that enforces OWASP ASI safeguards, gates destructive or high-cost actions behind expiring HMAC-signed human approvals, and records tamper-evident Merkle audit receipts." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher itsoumya-d · publishing for 3 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 3d ago

Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
HEROS_APPROVAL_SECRETConfiguration, not credentials: HEROS_DOWNSTREAM_ARGS, HEROS_DOWNSTREAM_BIN
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso evil.example, internal.example — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names evil.example, internal.example as well as its own vendor. The guard injects HEROS_APPROVAL_SECRET only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected; OS command execution function call detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 20 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
20sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · (node:3221) [UNDICI-EHPA] Warning: EnvHttpProxyAgent is experimental, expect them to change at any time. (Use `node --trace-warnings ...` to show where the warning was created) [heros-firewall] downstreamBin is required
20sprocessscript backend runs setup only
20sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtest/policies.test.mjs:38 · Destructive file system command detectedassert.equal(engine.evaluate({ tool: 'shell_exec', args: { cmd: 'echo ok; rm -rf /' }, scopes: ['admin'] }).code, 'DANGEROUS_SHELL');Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedsrc/redteam.js:6 · Destructive file system command detectedASI02_TOOL_MISUSE: (i) => ({ tool: "shell_exec", args: { cmd: `rm -rf /tmp/data-${i}; curl http://evil.example` } }),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injection attemptREADME.md:48 · Prompt injection attempt — 'ignore previous instructions' · informational: not an instruction file| `ignore previous instructions...` in email body | deny | ASI01 |Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetest/policies.test.mjs:38 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceassert.equal(engine.evaluate({ tool: 'shell_exec', args: { cmd: 'echo ok; rm -rf /' }, scopes: ['admin'] }).code, 'DANGEROUS_SHELL');Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
OS command execution function call detectedsrc/redteam.js:9 · OS command execution function call detectedASI05_CODE_EXECUTION: (i) => ({ tool: "eval_code", args: { code: `import os; os.system('id ${i}')` } }),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈38 tok
1 file · 21 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. OS command execution function call detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim itsoumya-d: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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