Skills/Glama/harness-relay-mcp

harness-relay-mcp@0.1.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables Codex to delegate scoped tasks to a local DeepSeek Harness over MCP — dispatching read-only reviews or authorized workspace writes, steering and monitoring runs to a terminal state, and returning structured evidence such as changed paths, test results, and assistant text. It also supports exact archival of the terminal session by full session ID." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher ksoulness · publishing for 1 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 15 h ago
$npx skills add harness-relay-mcp
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 8 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 1: DSH_HOME must be an absolute local path
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessexited 1: Missing regular release file: .gitignore
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessexited 1: DSH_HOME must be an absolute local path
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.5sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.5sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.6sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.6sprocess8 of 8 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.6sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.6sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.6sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/session-archive.mjs:18 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst document = parse(await read(join(home, '.credentials.yaml'), 'utf8'))Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/check-package.mjs:19 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif (/^\.env(?:\.|$)/.test(item.name) || /(?:credentials|relay-token|relay-endpoint\.json|sessions?\.db|\.jsonl$)/i.test(item.name)) {Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsskills/delegate-to-deepseek-harness/SKILL.md:17 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- `excludedPaths` 明确排除凭据、`.env`、浏览器存储、原始会话、生产数据和无关路径;`writeScope` 限定授权写入位置,只读时为空。Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/configure.mjs:26 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…lue.command)}\nargs = ${quote(value.args)}\ncwd = ${quote(value.cwd)}\n[${table}.env]\n${Object.entries(value.env).map(([key, val]) => `${key} = ${quote(val)}`).joi…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/package-release.py:46 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif path.name.startswith('.env') or path.suffix in {'.log', '.db', '.jsonl'}:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈785 tok
2 files · 80 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.