groundly@r1
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "Enables users to index their course materials locally and serve them to MCP-capable agents, which can then search the actual course content and answer with page-level citations. Every chunk carries a groundly:// URI so agents can open the exact page, with no API key or upload required." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is groundly@r1 safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
assert "../evil.txt" in result.outputFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.["../evil.txt", "materials/../../evil.txt", "/etc/passwd", "progress.db", "graph/../../evil"],Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."command": "f=$(jq -r '.tool_input.file_path // empty'); case \"$f\" in *.py) ;; *) exit 0 ;; esac; uv run ruff format \"$f\" >/dev/null 2>&1; uv run ruff check --fix \"$f\" >&2 || exit 2"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."[\u00ad\u034f\u061c\u115f\u1160\u17b4\u17b5\u180b-\u180f\u200b-\u200f\u202a-\u202e"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.zf.writestr(info, "/etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.