Skills/Glama/google-analytics-agent

google-analytics-agent@0.5.3

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "GA4 Data and Admin API tools: data quality audits, funnels, attribution, realtime and comparison reports, and property configuration checks. Admin changes are dry-run first and need terminal approval." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher arcbaslow · publishing for 6 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 6d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS or --oauth / --client-secret-file
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso shopify.com, sitemaps.org, acme.example, public.example — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names shopify.com, sitemaps.org, acme.example, public.example as well as its own vendor. The guard injects GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 74/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: URL with embedded credentials; URL with embedded credentials; URL to the cloud instance metadata address. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsscripts/ga4_report.py:30 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking@import url('https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Manrope:wght@400;500;600;700&display=swap');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/ga4_auth.py:80 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions# On Windows + non-NTFS filesystems chmod is a no-op; harmless.Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsscripts/ga4_report.py:178 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking@import url('https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Manrope:wght@400;500;600;700&display=swap');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/ga4_auth.py:258 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/ga4-custom-report/SKILL.md:5 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesargument-hint: "[--save <name> <def.json>] [--list] [--run <name> --property <id> [--days N] [--format md|html|pdf|json|csv] [--segment NAME] [--output PATH]]"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialsscripts/test_ga4_pinned_fetch.py:97 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingcontext.assert_fetchable("https://username:[email protected]/")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addressscripts/test_ga4_redirects.py:14 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentials"http://169.254.169.254/",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
CRITICAL
URL to the cloud instance metadata addressscripts/ga4_context.py:185 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentialspublicly routable, because `http://169.254.169.254/...` is the cloudFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈14,011 tok
12 files · 80 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

6 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim arcbaslow: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  6. URL to the cloud instance metadata address≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
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