google-ads-agents@0.6.1
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Read-only Google Ads tools: account audit, GAQL queries, anomaly and budget pacing checks, and change history. Profiles per MCC, gcloud sign-in by default." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
GOOGLE_ADS_DEVELOPER_TOKENGOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALSor--oauth-login/--set-developer-token/--client-secrets/--developer-token/--set-oauth/--client-secret/--refresh-tokenConfiguration, not credentials: CLOUDSDK_CONFIG, GOOGLE_ADS_LOGIN_CUSTOMER_ID, SystemDrive- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso telegram.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names telegram.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects GOOGLE_ADS_DEVELOPER_TOKEN, GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
python scripts/gads_creative.py prompts --brief /tmp/brief.json --output /tmp/prompts.jsonFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.python scripts/gads_report.py --input audit.json --format md --output audit.mdFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.python scripts/gads_creative.py prompts --brief /tmp/brief.json --output /tmp/prompts.jsonFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.