Skills/Glama/github-tools

github-tools@0.7.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables coding agents to read and modify GitHub issues, project boards, pull requests, repositories, releases, and Actions through configurable toolsets, with read-only and write-confirmation controls." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher craft-agent · publishing for 8 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 8d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.
It will ask for
unknown until the next run
Where it talks to
unknown until the next run
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Not enough was observed to say yet. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. This version's code has not been inventoried for credentials and hosts either; both arrive with its next honeypot run (popular servers first). `vet-skills try github-tools` runs it now and prints the full answer.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-06 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/faketime

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/entry/settings.ts:135 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst { confirm: _confirm, ...settings } = parseSettings(argv, { ...env, [confirmEnv]: undefined })Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/core/refs.ts:112 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesreturn { ...env, GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT: "0" }Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp/server.test.ts:151 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst failure = new Error("ENOENT: no such file '/Users/secret/project/.env'")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialssrc/core/refs.test.ts:150 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingconst repo = repoWithOrigin("https://x-access-token:[email protected]/o")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp/server.test.ts:188 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesexpect(logs[0]).toContain("/etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp/server.test.ts:187 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesexpect(textOf(result)).not.toContain("/etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialssrc/core/refs.test.ts:118 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking["https://x-access-token:[email protected]/octo/hello"],Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/server-json.mjs:37 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`Wrote ${output instanceof URL ? fileURLToPath(output) : output} for ${pkg.mcpName} ${pkg.version}.`)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/release.test.mjs:83 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code// npx runs the bin named like the unscoped package name when a package provides several bins.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp/server.test.ts:180 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesthrow "/etc/passwd"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialssrc/core/refs.test.ts:138 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking["https://x-access-token:[email protected]/o/r?token=ghp_secret#ghp_secret", "gitlab.example"],Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/core/gh.test.ts:189 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesexpect(ghEnv()).toMatchObject({ ...env, GH_PROMPT_DISABLED: "1" })Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialssrc/core/refs.test.ts:111 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking["https://user:[email protected]/octo/hello.git"],Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp/server.test.ts:164 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesexpect(logs[0]).toContain("/Users/secret/project/.env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/entry/settings.test.ts:217 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filessettingsFromOptions({ toolsets: ["repos"], read_only: false }, { ...env, GITHUB_TOOLS_READ_ONLY: "yes" }),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialssrc/core/refs.test.ts:136 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking["https://user:[email protected]/o/r", "gitlab.example"],Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈9,286 tok
3 files · 80 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim craft-agent: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  4. URL with embedded credentials≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  6. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
Publish a new version to Glama, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim craft-agentPropose a patch to the maintainer