Skills/Glama/github-fetcher

github-fetcher@0.2.1

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables AI coding agents to read GitHub repositories, files, commits, issues, pull requests, releases, Actions, and search results through 18 read-only MCP tools. It reuses existing credentials, routes around unreliable networks, and caches responses on disk to stay within rate limits." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher kurvcygnus · publishing for 3 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 3d ago
$npx skills add github-fetcher
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
GH_TOKENGITHUB_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: GITHUB_CACHE, GITHUB_CACHE_DIR, GITHUB_MCP_EXPOSE_IDENTITY, GITHUB_MCP_LOG, GITHUB_MCP_MAX_FILE_BYTES, GITHUB_MCP_TIMEOUT_MS, GITHUB_PROXY, GITHUB_PROXY_MODE
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso githubusercontent.com, com.proxy — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names githubusercontent.com, com.proxy as well as its own vendor. The guard injects GH_TOKEN, GITHUB_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 88/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/tools/compare.ts:70 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes//* One bad repo must not kill the batch: a GithubError becomes an error itemFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/verify-launch.mjs:9 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeconst INSTALL = "npx -y @kurvcygnus/github-fetcher@latest";Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandtest/core/cache.test.ts:95 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions//! chmod 0o000 does not make files unreadable on Windows (it only togglesFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈38 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.