gis-agent-bridges@r1
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Glama Dockerfile for YUYU20061107/gis-agent-bridges（合集仓） 使用方式：在 Glama 该 listing 的 Admin -> Dockerfile 页面直接粘贴本文件内容。 构建上下文为仓库根目录。 合集仓含 9 个包、9 个独立的 live/mcp_server.py；Glama 一个 listing 只能 对应一个 Dockerfile / 一个入口。本文件选 supermap 包作为合集的 Glama 入口 （依据见同目录 RESEARCH.md 第四节：旗舰包、唯一实机校准、且该文件与单仓 supermap-gis-bridge 的 live/mcp_server.py 逐字节相同）。 其余 8 个包同为纯标准库、同架构，技术上任选其一都能通过检查。 FROM python:3.12-sli" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
PGPASSWORDSTAC_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: FME_HOME, GDAL_BRIDGE_TIMEOUT, GNSS_WORK_DIR, GRASS_BRIDGE_BIN, GRASS_BRIDGE_EXPORT_DIR, GRASS_BRIDGE_GISDBASE, GRASS_BRIDGE_TIMEOUT, ISTSOS_BASE_URL, POSTGIS_ALLOWED_TABLES, POSTGIS_EXPORT_DIR, POSTGIS_PSQL, POSTGIS_PSQL_TIMEOUT, ProgramFiles, QGIS_PREFIX_PATH, STAC_BASE_URL- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso example.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names example.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects PGPASSWORD, STAC_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is gis-agent-bridges@r1 safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
proc = subprocess.run(argv, stdout=subprocess.PIPE,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(argv, stdout=subprocess.PIPE,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run([sys.executable, path], cwd=os.path.join(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.cp = subprocess.run([resolved] + args, capture_output=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(argv, stdout=subprocess.PIPE,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run([exe, "--version"], stdout=subprocess.PIPE,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.