Skills/Glama/ghostpaw-questlog

ghostpaw-questlog@0.14.2

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables agents to capture, shape, schedule, search, and retire tasks, deadlines, calendar events, and recurring commitments through twelve intent-shaped tools backed by a single unified SQLite model. Every call returns structured, discriminated results with next-step hints instead of thrown exceptions or ambiguous prose." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher ghostpawjs · publishing for 0 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
WEBHOOK_SECRETConfiguration, not credentials: DOCS_FONT_DIR, GHOSTPAW_OUTPUT, GHOSTPAW_QUIET, RUNS, STRIP
Where it talks to
ghostpaw.dev (its own)Also example.org, cloudflareinsights.com, anonyfox.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names example.org, cloudflareinsights.com, anonyfox.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects WEBHOOK_SECRET only into requests to ghostpaw.dev (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets WEBHOOK_SECRET=ghostpaw.dev -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 73/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Pipe-to-shell pattern; Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageskills/questlog/SKILL.md:537 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeUse `npx -y @ghostpaw/questlog ...` in npm-based environments (Node 24+). Harnesses that embed it in code can import `@ghostpaw/questlog` as a library.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellskills/questlog/SKILL.md:15 · Remote installer piped to shellcurl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/GhostPawJS/questlog/main/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Pipe-to-shell patternSKILL.md:15 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/GhostPawJS/questlog/main/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/sea/build.mjs:118 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`${output} (${mode}, ${(statSync(output).size / 1e6).toFixed(1)} MB)`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Pipe-to-shell patternskills/questlog/SKILL.md:15 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/GhostPawJS/questlog/main/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLskills/questlog/SKILL.md:15 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourcecurl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/GhostPawJS/questlog/main/install.sh | shFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellSKILL.md:15 · Remote installer piped to shellcurl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/GhostPawJS/questlog/main/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:537 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeUse `npx -y @ghostpaw/questlog ...` in npm-based environments (Node 24+). Harnesses that embed it in code can import `@ghostpaw/questlog` as a library.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsscripts/build_demo.mjs:35 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking@import url("https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Space+Grotesk:wght@400;500;600;700&family=Inter:wght@400;500&display=optional");Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLSKILL.md:15 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourcecurl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/GhostPawJS/questlog/main/install.sh | shFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/skills/webhooks.ts:7 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files… tick\n```\n\nCron may need `$HOME/.local/bin/questlog tick --db /path/to/quests.db`.\nWatch defaults to 60 s (minimum 5); SIGINT/SIGTERM finishes the tick.\nTick exits 0 even when deliveries need retries. Dry-run records nothing and sends…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈17,900 tok
2 files · 80 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

7 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim ghostpawjs: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  3. Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  4. URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  6. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
Publish a new version to Glama, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim ghostpawjsPropose a patch to the maintainer