Skills/Glama/ghost-audit-mcp

ghost-audit-mcp@1.0.1

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Enables MCP clients to deterministically audit claimed data-deletion requests, reconstruct what personal data remains reachable at a chosen cut-off, and retrieve evidence, case details, queues, what-if results, and verification outputs. It is read-only and lets agents build risk dashboards, review queues, case cards, and DPO briefs from the same capabilities as the CLI." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher miguelgarglez · publishing for 0 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 8 h ago
$npx skills add ghost-audit-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso python.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedcode/tests/test_confidence.py:100 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([sys.executable, "-c", env_code], check=True, capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filescode/evaluation/compliance_matrix.md:60 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction file| C1 | Log file `log.txt` at the repo root, append-only, UTF-8 / `\n`, resolved relative to `AGENTS.md` | `log.txt` | `test_log_txt_entries_have_tool_and_model` |Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedcode/ghost/media.py:44 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(["pdftotext", "-layout", str(p), "-"], capture_output=True, text=True).stdoutFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actioncode/tools/stress.py:10 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files* ``output.csv`` passes ``validate_output.py`` for that perturbed dataset;Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedcode/tests/test_regression.py:205 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([sys.executable, str(ROOT / "code" / "main.py"), "--out", str(out)], check=True, capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedcode/tools/stress.py:302 · Python subprocess execution detectedv = subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(VALIDATE), str(out)], env=env, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedcode/ghost_cli.py:127 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(Path(__file__).resolve()), "cases", "--format", "json"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedcode/tools/build_registry.py:46 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([a.python, "-m", "build", "--outdir", str(out / "dist"), str(py)], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedcode/tests/test_agent.py:148 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(ROOT / "code" / "ghost_mcp.py")], input="\n".join(json.dumps(r) for r in reqs) + "\nnot json\n",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedcode/tools/build_registry.py:52 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["npm", "pack", "--pack-destination", str(out)], check=True, cwd=npm)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actioncode/ghost_mcp.py:83 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files_tool("ghost_verify_output", "Verify output.csv", "Structural validation of output.csv (contract, vocabulary, ids, phase order) plus sha256 and status counts.",Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedcode/tests/test_demo.py:17 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(CODE / "ghost_cli.py"), *args], capture_output=True, text=True, env=env)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedcode/tools/stress.py:298 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(MAIN), "--out", str(out)], env=env, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedcode/ghost/media.py:32 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(["tesseract", str(src), "stdout", "--psm", psm], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedcode/evaluation/custom_cases.py:176 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([sys.executable, str(ROOT / "code" / "main.py"), "--out", str(out)], check=True, env=env,Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actioncode/evaluation/main.py:119 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data fileserrs = validate_output.validate(ROOT / "output.csv") if (ROOT / "output.csv").exists() else ["output.csv missing"]Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedcode/tests/test_agent.py:19 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([sys.executable, str(ROOT / "code" / "main.py")], check=True, capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈38 tok
1 file · 65 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.