gemini-bridge@0.1.0
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Enables Gemini to discover Claude Code sessions and Codex chats and send messages to them through a local stdio MCP interface, supporting direct agent-to-agent task delegation." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: AGENT_NAME, BRIDGE_LIB_DIR- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for API_KEY and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
`agy --model <m> --print-timeout <t> [--dangerously-skip-permissions] -p "<prompt>"`Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.const input = JSON.parse(Buffer.concat(chunks).toString('utf8').replace(/^/, ''));Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.Caller->>Agy: agy --model <m> --print-timeout <t> -p "<prompt>"Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.| Claude -> Gemini | From Claude, run a command to open a new Gemini session: `agy --model <m> --print-timeout <t> [--dangerously-skip-permissions] -p $prompt` (or `-p "<prompt>"`). | `[VERIFIED]` |Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.| Codex -> Gemini | From Codex, run a shell command: `agy --model <m> --print-timeout <t> [--dangerously-skip-permissions] -p $prompt` (or `-p "<prompt>"`). | `[VERIFIED]` |Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.