Skills/Glama/galaxy-surveys-mcp-server

galaxy-surveys-mcp-server@0.1.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables querying and analyzing spectroscopic galaxy survey data, including BAO/RSD compilations with cosmological fits and plots, SDSS SkyServer catalog queries and galaxy properties, and GSWLC-A2 catalog access and crossmatching." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher nesar-ai-assistant · publishing for 8 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 8d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.
It will ask for
unknown until the next run
Where it talks to
unknown until the next run
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Not enough was observed to say yet. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. This version's code has not been inventoried for credentials and hosts either; both arrive with its next honeypot run (popular servers first). `vet-skills try galaxy-surveys-mcp-server` runs it now and prints the full answer.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-06 and scored it 75/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Latin word with Cyrillic or Greek look-alike letters (homoglyph); Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_server/cli.py:27 · Python subprocess execution detectedps = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)SKILL.md:5 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkMCP server nesar-ai-assistant/galaxy-surveys-mcp-server on Glama, built from https://github.com/nesar-ai-assistant/galaxy-surveys-mcp-server.Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Latin word with Cyrillic or Greek look-alike letters (homoglyph)README.md:14 · Latin word with Cyrillic or Greek look-alike letters (homoglyph)ΛCDMFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmcp_server/dispatch.py:19 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescome from the USER's hep-genesis .env and sign-in - never from this server.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_server/cli.py:20 · Python subprocess execution detectedlsof = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionmcp_server/dispatch.py:53 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files# files and its dispatch_<job>.json record go to <output_dir>/<job>/ - theFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈50 tok
1 file · 58 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

5 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim nesar-ai-assistant: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
Publish a new version to Glama, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim nesar-ai-assistantPropose a patch to the maintainer