Skills/Glama/flux-mcp

flux-mcp@0.1.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Enables MCP clients to generate and edit images with a local FLUX 3 Image Klein model running in ComfyUI, covering text-to-image, multi-reference editing, bounding-box layouts, upscaling, and background removal. It is served over streamable HTTP with bearer-token authentication and returns previews plus full-resolution image links with prompt and seed metadata." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher geosp · publishing for 1 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 1 h ago
$npx skills add flux-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
FLUX_MCP_TOKEN or --no-auth
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for FLUX_MCP_TOKEN and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker-compose.yml:32 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFLUX_MCP_TOKEN: ${FLUX_MCP_TOKEN:?set FLUX_MCP_TOKEN in .env}Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:18 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsRUN useradd --uid 1000 --create-home flux && mkdir -p /data/images && chown flux /data/imagesFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:6 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/test_workflows.py:82 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files(tmp_path / "w.json").write_text(json.dumps({"1": {"class_type": "X", "inputs": {"a": 1}}}))Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_flux_service.py:81 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files("/etc/passwd", "image id returned by this server or an http"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
URL to a private-network addressdocker-compose.yml:33 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development targetFLUX_PUBLIC_BASE_URL: ${FLUX_PUBLIC_BASE_URL:-http://10.0.0.96:8300}Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈31 tok
1 file · 52 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.