flaxmcp-live@r1
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Flax Engine projects and the running editor: check and compile scripts, start play mode, call game commands, wait for editor events and read or write live actors. The editor bridge stays connected through script reloads." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is flaxmcp-live@r1 safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
Format: `[System] Description of the problem/topic`Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.…r add it to an existing toolset in `ToolsetCompanions` (see `CONVENTIONS.md`'s `[System]` table) — a tool that exists but isn't in the registry isn't reachable. - Respe…Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.return lambda: subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run(arguments, cwd=self.repository, capture_output=True, text=True, encoding="utf-8",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.stderr, kill and wait)."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Tools/ [McpServerToolType] classesFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.self._process = subprocess.Popen([os.path.abspath(exe)], stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stdout=subprocess.PIPE,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.The bracketed prefix `[System]` = module/area. Use the module names as they appear in `src/`:Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.