Skills/Glama/fittest-mcp

fittest-mcp@0.1.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Enables MCP clients to submit molecular structures and get a verdict on whether machine-learned interatomic potentials can be trusted or DFT should be called, with trust scores, recommended models or blends, per-atom uncertainty, and written explanations. Also exposes swarm status, member reputations, and usage statistics." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher pavel-tk · publishing for 3 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 3d ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso figshare.com, pytorch.org, nvidia.com, astral.sh, azure.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Latin word with Cyrillic or Greek look-alike letters (homoglyph); Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/setup_cpu.sh:28 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y -qq g++ python3.12-devFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actioncolab/evoc/peek.py:2 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesimport subprocess print(subprocess.run(r'''for f in /content/logs/evc_*.log; do echo "== $f"; grep -E "^\[(static|evolved|noselect)|exit|Error|Traceback|RUN_DONE" $f | tail -8; done; ls /content/fittest/results/evolution_c/cache/*.result.js…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Latin word with Cyrillic or Greek look-alike letters (homoglyph)README.md:59 · Latin word with Cyrillic or Greek look-alike letters (homoglyph)ΔAUROCFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actioncolab/peek.py:2 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesprint(subprocess.run(r"sed -n '1,7p;40,140p' /content/logs/install.log | cut -c1-200", shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True).stdout)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/setup_cpu.sh:30 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecommand -v uv >/dev/null || { echo "installing uv"; curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh; }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedcolab/sync.sh:11 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -f /tmp/ts_$ID.tgz /tmp/untar_$ID.pyFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedcolab/peek.py:2 · Python subprocess execution detectedprint(subprocess.run(r"sed -n '1,7p;40,140p' /content/logs/install.log | cut -c1-200", shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True).stdout)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedcolab/fix1.py:3 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(c, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=t); print(r.stdout[-3000:], r.stderr[-2000:])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedcolab/peek.py:3 · Python subprocess execution detected…l.log | cut -c1-200", shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True).stdout) print(subprocess.run("curl -sIL -A 'Mozilla/5.0' https://figshare.com/ndownloader/files/36035789 | gr…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsdeck/gen.py:809 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking"href": "https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Instrument+Serif:ital@0;1&display=swap"},Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsdeck/preview.py:14 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking<link rel="stylesheet" href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Instrument+Serif:ital@0;1&family=Geist:[email protected]&family=Geist+Mono:wght@400;500&display=swap">Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedcolab/install2.sh:4 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -rf /content/envs/orbFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedcolab/sync.sh:9 · Destructive file system command detected…ir -p /content/fittest && cd /content/fittest && tar xzf /content/ts_$ID.tgz && rm /content/ts_$ID.tgz && echo SYNC_OK', shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True)…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsdeck/gen.py:810 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking"geist": {"family": "Geist", "href": "https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Geist:[email protected]&display=swap"},Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsdeck/gen.py:812 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking"href": "https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Geist+Mono:wght@400;500&display=swap"}},Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorydeploy/deploy.sh:8 · References a credential file in the home directoryKEY=${KEY:-$HOME/.ssh/id_rsa}Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedcolab/fetch.sh:5 · Python subprocess execution detectedecho "import subprocess; print(subprocess.run('cd /content/fittest && tar czf /content/f_$ID.tgz $REL && echo PACK_OK', shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True))" > /tmp/pack_$ID.pyFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/setup_cpu.sh:27 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt-get update -qqFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedcolab/evoc/peek.py:2 · Python subprocess execution detectedimport subprocess print(subprocess.run(r'''for f in /content/logs/evc_*.log; do echo "== $f"; grep -E "^\[(static|evolv…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/setup_gpu.sh:26 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecommand -v uv >/dev/null || { echo "installing uv"; curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh; export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH"; }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/setup_gpu.sh:26 · Remote installer piped to shellcommand -v uv >/dev/null || { echo "installing uv"; curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh; export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH"; }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedcolab/sync.sh:9 · Python subprocess execution detected…tgz 2>&1 | grep -i -E "error|fail" | head -3 || true echo "import subprocess; r=subprocess.run('mkdir -p /content/fittest && cd /content/fittest && tar xzf /content/ts_$ID.tgz…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedcolab/probe.py:6 · Python subprocess execution detectedprint(subprocess.run("free -g; which uv; python -c 'import torch;print(torch.__version__, torch.version.cuda)'",shell=True,capture_output=True,text=True).stdout)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detecteddeck/preview.py:43 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([CHROME, "--headless=new", "--disable-gpu", "--hide-scrollbars", "--window-size=1920,1080",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedcolab/probe.py:2 · Python subprocess execution detectedprint(subprocess.run(["nvidia-smi","--query-gpu=name,memory.total,driver_version","--format=csv,noheader"],capture_output=True,text=True).stdout.strip() or "NO GPU")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/evolve_c.py:118 · Python subprocess execution detectedrunning.append((s, subprocess.Popen(cmd, stdout=log, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, env=env,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/demo_service.py:49 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=1800)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/evolve.py:84 · Python subprocess execution detectedrunning.append((s, subprocess.Popen(cmd, stdout=log, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, env=env,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedcolab/probe.py:3 · Python subprocess execution detectedprint(subprocess.run(["nvidia-smi"],capture_output=True,text=True).stdout.split("\n")[2])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/setup_cpu.sh:30 · Remote installer piped to shellcommand -v uv >/dev/null || { echo "installing uv"; curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh; }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈33 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim pavel-tk: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
Publish a new version to Glama, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim pavel-tkPropose a patch to the maintainer