Skills/Glama/findabis

findabis@r1

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Findabis MCP gives AI assistants read-only access to Findabis, the UK directory and comparison service for medical cannabis. Assistants can find clinics and pharmacies near a location, look up products, strains and brands, compare providers side by side, check a provider's listing, and pull directory-wide facts. Every answer links back to the live Findabis page, so prices and stock can be checked" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher findabis · publishing for 5 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 5d ago
$npx skills add findabis
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso findabis.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is findabis@r1 safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.md:84 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file1. Open **Settings → Apps & Connectors**. Custom servers sit under **Advanced settings** (developer mode).Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/server/mcp/limits.ts:6 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes/** Callers presenting an API token, per token — a named caller gets more room and a kill switch */Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/server/mcp/callerIdentity.ts:16 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes* per-token quota that does not share a NAT with strangers, and a killFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/publish.yml:103 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo install -m 0755 mcp-publisher /usr/local/bin/mcp-publisherFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/app/api/mcp/route.ts:56 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// and a kill switch; a bad token is refused, not downgraded to anonymousFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)skills/findabis/SKILL.md:22 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network{ "mcpServers": { "findabis": { "url": "https://findabis.com/api/mcp" } } }Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:84 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file1. Open **Settings → Apps & Connectors**. Custom servers sit under **Advanced settings** (developer mode).Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,403 tok
6 files · 51 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.