Skills/Glama/figma-taxonomy-gen

figma-taxonomy-gen@0.4.2

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Extracts an analytics event taxonomy from Figma designs, flags drift against later design changes and exports it as a tracking plan." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher arcbaslow · publishing for 6 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 6d ago
$npx skills add figma-taxonomy-gen
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
AMPLITUDE_API_KEYAMPLITUDE_SECRET_KEYANTHROPIC_API_KEYFIGMA_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRETFIGMA_TOKENFIGMA_TOKEN_TYPE
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso amplitude.com, figma.com, claude.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names amplitude.com, figma.com, claude.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects AMPLITUDE_API_KEY, AMPLITUDE_SECRET_KEY, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, FIGMA_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET, FIGMA_TOKEN, FIGMA_TOKEN_TYPE only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 91/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.3sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.3sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.4sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/test_amplitude_csv.py:72 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesargs = ["extract", "--fixture", str(FIXTURES / "banking_app.json"), "--output", str(tmp_path / "out")]Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

No other findings across 11,211 lines in 81 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,791 tok
3 files · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.