Skills/Glama/figma-developer-mcp

figma-developer-mcp@0.3.1

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables AI coding agents such as Cursor to access simplified Figma layout and styling data from file, frame, or group links so they can implement designs more accurately in code." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher acrt-eval · publishing for 0 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 2 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
FIGMA_API_KEYFIGMA_OAUTH_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: npm_lifecycle_event, NPM_PACKAGE_VERSION
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso figma.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names figma.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects FIGMA_API_KEY, FIGMA_OAUTH_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 66/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/config.ts:6 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Load environment variables from .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentREADME.md:104 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentprettier-ignore-startFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/cli.ts:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconfig({ path: resolve(process.cwd(), ".env") });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known package.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug_report.md:53 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code> npx figma-developer-mcp --figma-api-key=REDACTEDFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/mcp.ts:78 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesLogger.log("Sending result to client");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known package.github/workflows/release.yml:35 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codepublish: npx changeset publishFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/config.ts:98 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"Either FIGMA_API_KEY or FIGMA_OAUTH_TOKEN is required (via CLI argument or .env file)",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known package.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug_report.md:14 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code- Figma Developer MCP: Run the MCP with `--version`—either npx or locally, depending on how you're running it.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/cli.ts:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Load .env from the current working directoryFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/server.ts:75 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesLogger.log("Sending progress notification", progress);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈44 tok
1 file · 36 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

14 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Text that tells the agent to ignore its instructions≈ +9 on the totalDelete phrases like "ignore previous instructions", "override", "bypass" from SKILL.md and tool descriptions. Describe what the skill does; do not instruct the agent about other rules.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim acrt-eval: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  6. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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