Skills/Glama/emperor-pdf

emperor-pdf@r1

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Enables agents to read, search, and render PDFs confined to a single root folder, with hidden-text warnings and options to merge, split, and create PDFs from Markdown. Read-only by default, with writing tools offered only when explicitly enabled." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry GlamaPublisher yarenty · publishing for 7 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 7d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Before you give it your token

Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.
It will ask for
unknown until the next run
Where it talks to
unknown until the next run
What the honeypot saw
nothing has run yet
What we could not test
everything: the server has not run yet

Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is emperor-pdf@r1 safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 57/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; URL with embedded credentials; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/root.rs:193 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert!(Root::check("/etc/passwd").is_err());Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialssrc/source.rs:408 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingassert!(check_url(&u("https://user:[email protected]/a.pdf"), false).is_err());Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/source.rs:404 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert!(check_url(&u("file:///etc/passwd"), false).is_err());Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:51 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:27 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/cli.rs:38 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files.env("PDF_WRITABLE", "maybe")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/docker-smoke.sh:38 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 644 "$tmp/hello.pdf"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/docker-smoke.sh:11 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 755 "$tmp"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/cli.rs:14 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files.env("PDF_WRITABLE", value)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,773 tok
2 files · 38 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

23 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim yarenty: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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