Skills/Glama/ember

ember@0.9.22

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Provides coding agents with persistent, queryable repository memory over MCP, enabling code search, cited question answering, repo maps, decision logs, and cross-session notes through local-first tools." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher dp177 · publishing for 1 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 20 h ago
$npx skills add ember
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
EMBER_API_KEYEMBER_MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENSConfiguration, not credentials: CHROME_PATH, EMBER_API_BASE, EMBER_ASK_MIN_SCORE, EMBER_CHAT_BASE, EMBER_CHAT_MODEL, EMBER_CHECKPOINT_CHUNKS, EMBER_CHECKPOINT_FILES, EMBER_CHECKPOINT_MS, EMBER_EMBED_BATCH, EMBER_EMBED_DIM, EMBER_EMBED_MODEL, EMBER_EVAL_DIR, EMBER_EVAL_EMBEDDER, EMBER_EVAL_LEX_DIM, EMBER_EVAL_REF, EMBER_EVAL_REPO, EMBER_HNSW, EMBER_HYBRID, EMBER_INDEX_RESULT_JSON, EMBER_LEXICAL, EMBER_LOCAL_EMBED, EMBER_LOCAL_EMBED_DIM, EMBER_LOCAL_EMBED_MODEL, EMBER_MAX_CALLS, EMBER_MAX_FILES, EMBER_MAX_PROMPT_CHARS, EMBER_PROBE_MODE, EMBER_PROBE_OUT, EMBER_PROGRESS_FILES, EMBER_REMOTE_EMBED
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso githubusercontent.com, openrouter.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names githubusercontent.com, openrouter.ai as well as its own vendor. The guard injects EMBER_API_KEY, EMBER_MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENS only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/cli.ts:209 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesif (estTok > 0) console.log(`estimated input tokens (chars/4, provider reported nothing): ${estTok}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/ui.test.ts:94 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert.equal((await fetch(`${base}/api/file?path=${encodeURIComponent("/etc/passwd")}`)).status, 403);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstest/github-load.test.ts:76 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking["https://user:[email protected]/pallets/flask", "credentials in URL"],Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/core/indexer.ts:248 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// ~30s of embedding to a kill - measured motivation: on a 2-core/2 GBFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Refusal suppressiondocs/ARCHITECTURE.md:196 · Refusal suppression — attempting to prevent safety responses · informational: not an instruction fileEmber never refuses to answer on a stale index.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/ui.test.ts:97 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesawait fs.symlink("/etc/passwd", path.join(dir, "leak.ts"));Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/context.test.ts:40 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesawait assert.rejects(() => readSourceContext(dir, "/etc/passwd", 1, 5), /escapes the repo root/);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈29 tok
1 file · 78 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.