elementor-live@0.1.0
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Enables coding agents to work inside a live WordPress Elementor editor tab: reading the canvas skeleton and element settings, creating/updating/moving/deleting elements through Elementor's own command API as single undo steps, taking pixel-accurate screenshots, running design lint, and receiving prompts the user types in the editor with Alt+Space. A ghost cursor and overlay let you follow along, and nothing touches the database directly." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
ELIVE_WP_APP_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: ELIVE_CDP_URL, ELIVE_DEV_PASS, ELIVE_DEV_POST, ELIVE_DEV_URL, ELIVE_DEV_USER, ELIVE_HEADLESS, ELIVE_PROFILE_DIR, ELIVE_WP_URL, ELIVE_WP_USER- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for ELIVE_WP_APP_PASSWORD and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
expect(bad.json).toMatchObject({ code: 'invalid_input' });Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.expect(res.json.computed.fontSize).toBe(16);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.console.log(` box=${JSON.stringify(g.box)} fontSize=${g.computed.fontSize} lineHeight=${g.computed.lineHeight}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.expect(ok.json).toMatchObject({ connected: true, postId: 12 });Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.