electroscope@0.1.1
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Enables AI clients to request still frames, sequences, cropped close-ups, and camera adjustments from an electronics microscope while the companion app retains the live camera view. It also provides visibility and control over captured frames through an access switch and capture history." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
APP_STORE_CONNECT_API_KEY_IDAPP_STORE_CONNECT_API_KEY_PATHConfiguration, not credentials: ELECTROSCOPE_CAMERA, ELECTROSCOPE_EXE, ELECTROSCOPE_FAKE_CAMERA, ELECTROSCOPE_HOST, ELECTROSCOPE_PORT, ELECTROSCOPE_USER_DATA- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso evil.example — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names evil.example as well as its own vendor. The guard injects APP_STORE_CONNECT_API_KEY_ID, APP_STORE_CONNECT_API_KEY_PATH only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 74/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: README directs the reader to a committed installer; README links to an external installer. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
run: npx electron-builder --mac --arm64 --publish never --config build/release.mac.cjsFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.<a href="https://github.com/UnlikeOtherAI/Electroscope/releases/latest/download/Electroscope-Windows-x64-Setup.exe"><img alt="Download for Windows x64" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Download_for_WFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.https://github.com/UnlikeOtherAI/Electroscope/releases/latest/download/Electroscope-Windows-x64-Setup.exeFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.console.log(`\n${results.length - failed.length}/${results.length} passed. Output: ${outDir}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.run: npx electron-builder --win --x64 --publish never --config build/release.win.cjsFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.npx electron-builder --mac dir --arm64 --config.mac.notarize=falseFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.expect(p).toContain('http://192.168.1.165:7821/mcp');Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.expect(p).toContain('http://192.168.1.165:7821/health');Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.expect(p).toContain('claude mcp add --transport http electroscope http://192.168.1.165:7821/mcp');Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.Readouts, kept to the corners so they never sit on the work.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.`- Clients that only start local stdio servers: use npx -y mcp-remote ${url}`,Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.expect(await post({ origin: 'http://192.168.1.77:9999', host: `127.0.0.1:${http.port}` })).toBe(403);Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.expect(p).toContain('http://10.0.0.8:7821/mcp');Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
6 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- README directs the reader to a committed installer≈ +9 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim unlikeotherai: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- README links to an external installer≈ +4 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
- URL to a private-network address≈ +1 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.